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CONTRACTS, TREATIES,  
AND THE PUBLIC SPACE†  
Jérôme Sgard* 
Daniela Caruso asks whether private law concepts may be 
instrumental in defending the interests of aggrieved third-
parties to Regional Trade Agreements, or whether the 
former are doomed to remain ignored “non-parties.” This 
comment builds on her arguments and extends the 
discussion to the case of sovereign debts and IMF 
conditionality, where the parties also tend to act as 
“monadic,” realist, international agents. The hypothesis 
that emerges is pessimistic: in the absence of a developed 
jurisdictional order—a form of constitutionalization—
third-parties and their interests are as difficult to identify 
as the broader public space where they should belong.  
INTRODUCTION 
In his 1927 doctoral thesis, Private Law Sources and Analo-
gies of International Law, Hersch Lauterpacht contends that, 
being “a true offspring of the doctrine of sovereignty,” inter-
national law “was bound to reject any recourse to private law 
as concerned with interests deemed to be of an economic and 
lower order.”1 He confronts this classical position and under-
lines, in particular, that “if the main distinction between pri-
vate and public law is that the first regulates the relations of 
legal entities in a state of co-ordination, and the second the 
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relations of those in a state of sub-ordination to one another, 
then, formally, international public law belongs to the genus 
private law.”2 From this point onward, he explores a number 
of “analogies” that could be usefully drawn from the field of 
private law and put to use by international lawyers: contracts 
and quasi-contracts, to begin, but also torts and damages, ar-
bitration, and bankruptcy.3 
In her article, Daniela Caruso follows in the steps of Lau-
terpacht, although she does not mention him. And whereas 
her predecessor did not touch on commercial or economic mat-
ters—only on abstract legal conceptions—she considers the 
case of international trade agreements: can private law offer 
conceptual tools that might help account for the large nega-
tive externalities of Regional Trade Agreements (“RTAs”) on 
non-members (p. 393)? She thus echoes a long line of eco-
nomic research that has tried for decades to measure the “di-
version effects” of RTAs.4 Moreover, as she draws on the pri-
vate law vocabulary, she adopts a critical perspective vis-à-
vis its laissez-faire expression, as predicated on formally neu-
tral notions of privity, autonomy, and symmetry between the 
parties–a classic, nineteenth-century discourse which was, in 
fact, Lauterpacht’s implied reference. Caruso thus raises the 
political question of whether private law concepts, such as 
tort, may support a judicial strategy aimed at correcting un-
even or unfair real-world economic relations (pp. 395, 409). 
She applies this questioning in particular to GATT Articles 
XXIII and XXIV and makes references to the Legal Realists’ 
progressive judicial strategy (pp. 421–26). She discusses in 
particular Oliver Wendell Holmes’s jurisprudence on labor 
relations (p. 416). 
On the whole, and beyond the heuristic benefits of this 
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comparison, the following conclusions of the Article are ra-
ther underwhelming: historically, the private law concepts 
have offered only partial and fragile support to aggrieved 
third parties; the two cited articles of the GATT Treaty are 
hard to leverage and their potential distributive outcomes are 
difficult to predict; and issues of jurisdiction add a further de-
gree of uncertainty.  
I. WHICH JURISDICTION? 
A first limit of the overall argument is entirely pragmatic: 
Caruso’s corrective ambition regarding the present state of 
the world economy is premised on the existence of a final ad-
judicative body with the authority to identify and sanction 
negative externalities on “non-parties.” She underlines that 
the absence of a tax-and-transfer mechanism across countries 
is a key argument for drawing on private—rather than pub-
lic—law concepts (p. 412). But she goes on to offer only vague 
suggestions regarding the judicial machinery that would be 
able to pass judgments and provide remedies: after raising 
doubts on the appropriateness of relying on the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (p.429), she mentions “arbitrators” without 
offering any more information on how they would have juris-
diction and guarantee execution of the judgment. In other 
words, we are back to square one: unless this dimension is 
fully considered, there are serious risks that the generic no-
tion of a contract and the analogies it may be associated with 
become highly abstract and decontextualized, and thus inop-
erable. The debate may then rapidly flow back into the old 
natural rights discourse, where contracts are typically talked 
about as a self-contained and self-justificatory social institu-
tion.  
This question about jurisdiction is illustrated by the way 
Caruso envisions the WTO trade regime. The Article seems 
to consider the GATT and WTO treaties as similar in nature 
to RTA treaties; this view is aligned with the large body of 
literature referenced in the Article that construes treaties as 
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contracts between sovereigns.5 The GATT and WTO treaties 
would simply present a broader, more inclusive or more com-
prehensive basis, though ultimately, the analogy with con-
tracts would apply to both the GATT and WTO and the RTAs 
treaties in similar terms. Of course, this perspective raises a 
host of well-known questions, such as whether countries may 
adhere to multilateral treaties or conventions unilaterally af-
ter promulgation, without having been party to the drafting 
and without the drafters having a say. This dilemma raised 
became a serious obstacle as soon as multilateral agreements 
started to be negotiated upon at the League of Nations during 
the 1920s.6  
The paradox is that, at the same time, Caruso also seems 
to suggest that the GATT and WTO regime is more akin to 
some kind of public or constitutional law, common to all sov-
ereign states, because it establishes the “level playing field”—
and a jurisdiction—on which fair and unified international 
markets should rest. From this viewpoint, RTAs may well be 
seen as specific, exclusive opt-outs—hence, as a contract-like 
private arrangement—while the WTO rules can be construed 
as a set of default rules. The broad policy debate on the vari-
ous possibilities offered to post-Brexit Britain underlined this 
point quite well: a “no-deal Brexit” was taken to imply that 
Britain would only trade on the basis of WTO rules, until it 
enters a new generation of specific “contracts.”7 In other 
words, there would be a hierarchy of norms, though no 
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hierarchy of jurisdictions; the WTO and its Dispute Settle-
ment Body have not established legal authority or jurisdic-
tion over RTAs—or opt-out contracts—so the multiplication 
of RTAs and opt-out contracts has led to a non-hierarchic, or 
“anarchic,” international trade regime.8 Hence, as Caruso 
rightly argues, the multiplication of RTAs fractures the 
global trade regime, destroys the underlying common good 
and leaves us with a more unfair, degraded (or “cannibal-
ized,” p. 403) set of rules. But while she points to a broadly 
negative appraisal of the politics of the WTO, her overall per-
spective ultimately suggests that anything short of a return 
to fully-fledged, immaculate multilateralism would not work. 
At this point, private law tools may only offer to serve as a 
prop, at best. 
II.  THE VEIL OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Moving beyond Caruso’s specific, trade-related discussion, we 
can take her discussion of private law analogies to other legal 
terrains. One problem that soon comes up is whether sover-
eignty is construed in terms that actually support the far-
reaching contractual analogies that Caruso explores. To start 
with, when a country is exposed to negative externalities of 
an RTA to which it is not a party, those adverse effects are 
first perceived and recorded by private businesses whose 
trading conditions deteriorate. This chain of effects is signifi-
cantly different than what occurs with military alliances, for 
instance. One should thus assume that the aggregation of 
these private resident agents results in a self-standing polit-
ical body, with a capacity to contract with similar entities (or 
to sue them). But this step asks that we ignore the various 
underlying conditions and conflicts of interest among 
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individual agents. The “Veil of Sovereignty,” or what econo-
mists call a “composition effect,” explains the difficulty of as-
sessing the distributive effects of potential remedies.  
Another question, following the contractual analogy as 
applied to sovereign, is what holds together the parties to a 
treaty-as-a-contract in a world without a credible adjudica-
tion and enforcement authority. The reference that Caruso 
makes to the “transactional” diplomacy of the Trump admin-
istration underlines the point and asks whether this new 
class of inter-state transactions rests on anything other than 
crude power relationships or strictly-aligned interests (p. 
398). In other words, these “transactional” treaties would be 
self-enforceable. But in turn, we are prompted to ask, what 
was different about classic multilateral treaty-making? The 
fact that a major treaty member threatens to exit these trea-
ties suggests that the latter do exercise a degree of practical 
constraints on the members’ discretion. Should we thus con-
clude that there are two classes of treaties, one of which is 
endowed with some kind of legal-contractual force and the 
other which might not?  
The core question is therefore whether “contracting with 
a sovereign” is a proposition that makes any sense at all. 
Economists and specialists of International Relations have 
long underlined both the seminal and the problematic char-
acters of this analogy.9 Many economists, for example, defend 
that a sovereign debt contract does not rest on the “capacity 
to pay”—hence on a (private) notion of solvency—but on “the 
willingness to pay”—in other words, on the discretionary, 
unilateral decision of the sovereign. At this point, we are fully 
in the language of “the nation-state as a monadic actor” (p. 
397), an animal that will only engage its peers in a self-inter-
ested, norm-free, realist mode.  
A classic example in this discussion is to ask why there is 
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such a thing as a sovereign debt market, if no rule and no 
court can ever bear on the behavior of a debtor country. The 
realist answer is that private institutions lend to sovereigns 
and rationally expect to be serviced because of the economic 
costs that a default would cause to the debtor: closed access 
to international finance, intense difficulties to finance foreign 
trade, a probable direct hit on the domestic banking sector. 
Debtor states would thus have a powerful incentive to protect 
their good reputations, which they should see as some sort of 
capital, the return of which would take the form of easy and 
cheap access to the capital markets. From this perspective, 
any support provided to a distressed debtor by a third party, 
like the International Monetary Fund, is doomed to reduce 
the incentives to serve the contract à la lettre and protect 
one’s reputation. Because such support would mitigate the 
costs of a possible default, it would inevitably make it more 
probable.10 In other words, in a “transactional” or realist 
world—and contrary to the context described by Caruso—an 
institutional mechanism for crisis management and dispute 
resolution would become a source of moral hazard, and hence, 
of a structural decline of the market. Here, contractual disci-
pline rests entirely on a logic of dissuasion, that is on a cred-
ible threat of retaliation. Powerful forces seem here to oppose 
any attempt at internalizing a concern for third-parties, or for 
externalities. 
We may also refer here to a long list of historical or socio-
legal contributions that explore how this microeconomic logic 
can sustain a variety of market structures. Examples include 
Avner Greiff’s analysis of the medieval Maghribi trade,11 Lisa 
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Bernstein’s classic study of New York diamond dealers,12 or 
the broad literature on micro-credit or cases of privately-or-
dered market platform.13 In all those cases, the exclusion of a 
delinquent party is loosely mediated or formalized, so that 
the legal character of the underlying transaction is generally 
narrow, if not dubious. The question from our present discus-
sion is whether these private orders have a capacity to ad-
dress the interests and grievance of non-members. And the 
presumptive answer is, as a rule, no. 
III.  HOW THE IMF SHAPES TRANSACTIONS WITH A 
SOVEREIGN: CONDITIONALITY AND THIRD-PARTIES 
At the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, the IMF received the 
mandate and the financial resources to support member-
states at times of crisis. The problem was how the Fund could 
structure these financial operations to guarantee good policy 
outcomes and capital reimbursement. Remarkably, the solu-
tion was not found before 1953, under the form of the Stand-
By Agreement (“SBA”), which was construed explicitly as nei-
ther a contract nor a treaty:14 the father of the Fund’s legal 
doctrine, Joseph Gold, insisted many times that it should not 
be analogous to either a private bank loan nor a UN regis-
tered treaty like World Bank loans. The most visible correlate 
of this founding rule is that SBAs have been comprised, since 
then, of two separate unilateral commitments: one document 
is sent by the country to the Fund, where the country lists its 
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policy commitments; and another one, issued by the Fund, 
then specifies that a specific amount of money will be made 
available to the country to use. In other words, the money is 
not explicitly lent—a step which would imply contractual lan-
guage; it only “stands by.” More generally, no single docu-
ment is ever signed by the two parties together during the 
whole life cycle of this proxy of a “loan.” Institutionalized 
rules of monitoring and enforcement (that is, conditionality) 
then add credibility to the word of the debtor country, in a 
well-structured, sequential, strategic game where both par-
ties are expected to act in a means-end rational way. 
In Joseph Gold’s writings, the rejection of the contractual 
language is first justified by the sheer complexity of all the 
variables that might affect the capacity—or indeed the will-
ingness—of the sovereign government to remain faithful to 
its word. If a private law language had been adopted, break-
ing such contractual commitments would have proved too dis-
ruptive and therefore unhelpful.15 Deviations over time are 
normal under an SBA and they should be the object of contin-
uing discussion and negotiation, though under the ever-pre-
sent threat that the whole program might be suspended or 
cancelled. But even at that point, the expectation built into 
the Fund’s rules of engagement is that negotiations should 
start again and a new transaction be entertained in the not-
too-distant future. Membership to the IMF thus constrains 
how this relationship is imagined, if only because exclusion is 
not an option. 
This strategic, non-contractual game comes with a signif-
icant correlate: the IMF has never asked that an SBA be 
voted on by the parliament of a crisis-country, submitted to a 
referendum, or be approved by a crisis-country’s highest 
court.16 The Fund’s legal doctrine is also adamant that any 
dispute over the interpretation and execution of the initial 
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two-way transaction should never be opened to a dispute-re-
solver, such as an international court or an arbitration panel; 
rather, it should remain entirely within the scope of the bilat-
eral strategic discussion, which should thus be allowed to 
work as a self-contained forum where only two parties can 
enter: the IMF and the executive power of the member-coun-
try. Any extension of this discussion to a third party, even if 
it were affected by the agreement, is alien to this transac-
tional logic. The logic of the realist, non-contractual SBA ap-
pears to thus confirm an emerging hypothesis, namely that 
in a post-multilateral trade regime, just as in a sovereign debt 
(or micro-credit) market, transactions between monadic bor-
rowers remain possible. Legal engineers have designed viable 
models of transactions in which enforcement do not rest on a 
judicial authority with enforcement capacities. There is a 
suggestion, however, that there is no room here for third par-
ties or for a recognition of their interests and claims. 
 CONCLUSION 
At least three salient and converging questions thus emerge 
from the present discussion: can private law concepts be lev-
eraged in favor of third parties, or non-parties, in an environ-
ment devoid of a binding hierarchy of jurisdictions? Should 
the GATT and WTO treaties be envisaged as some kind of 
default rules, or indeed as the multilateral Grundnorm of in-
ternational trade, that may potentially support “non-parties” 
in RTAs as they ask for redress? And does the self-contained 
structure of the IMF SBA illustrate a more general rule, 
whereby transnational legal orders may have strong, specific 
regulatory effects, although without ever being in a position 
to interact and negotiate formally with third parties?17 
These three themes, in other words, all raise a question of 
constitutionalization, defined as a set of norms and norm-en-
forcing authorities that establishes the division between 
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private and public, allowing for both a capacity to govern and 
for the defense of a set of basic rights. We know that these 
conditions are absent from today’s global world, where the 
public and the private are undifferentiated. Hence, the ques-
tion that Caruso ultimately raises is whether the present 
state of third parties reflects the impossibility in general to 
identify, in legally effective terms, the notions of a public good 
and of a public space. Who are “non-parties,” if not the silent 
and invisible representatives of “the public”? 
